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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Craig Allen Hunter entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of felony
driving under the influence, preserving his right to challenge the district court's order
denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Hunter asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his Motion to Suppress because Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain him.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While driving in Caldwell, Mr. Hunter approached Cleveland Boulevard from a
parking lot and came to a complete stop prior to turning onto Cleveland Boulevard.
(Tr. 11/8/13, p.15, Ls.4-11.) Cleveland Boulevard is a one-way, two-lane road that goes
east. (Tr. 11 /8/13, p.14, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Hunter pulled across the right lane, immediately
signaled with his left blinker, and moved into the left lane.

(R., p.45.) He traveled

approximately 150 feet while signaling with his left blinker, then proceeded to turn left
onto 26th Avenue. (R., p.45.) Thereafter, he was pulled over by Corporal Pelkey for
failing to utilize a turn signal for five seconds, which Corporal Pelkey believed was a
violation of Idaho Code section 49-808(2). (R., p.45.) Corporal Pelkey testified that he
smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Hunter's car and that Mr. Hunter's eyes
were bloodshot and glassy. (Tr. 11/8/13, p.7, Ls.3-17.) After conducting field sobriety
tests, Corporal Pelkey arrested Mr. Hunter for driving under the influence. (Tr. 11/8/14,
p.8, L.1 - p.11, L.15.) Mr. Hunter was ultimately charged with felony driving under the
influence. (R., pp.18-19.)
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Mr. Hunter filed a motion to suppress all evidence that was obtained after Officer
Pelkey stopped him.

(R., pp.32-39.) He asserted that Corporal Pelkey did not have

reasonable suspicion to detain him because, given that Cleveland Boulevard is not a
controlled access highway, provision of 49-808(2) that requires that a driver signal
continuously for five seconds prior to turning did not apply to Cleveland Boulevard and,
therefore, he did not violate any traffic laws. (R., pp.32-39.) Mr. Hunter also argued
that the provision of section 49-808(2) that required that a driver, on roads other than
controlled access highways, to signal for 100 feet before turning was void because it did
not inform a citizen as to what the appropriate signaling process was if there were fewer
than 100 feet of travel. (R., pp.34-39.)
At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Corporal Pelkey testified he measured
the distance from the center of Cleveland Boulevard at Mr. Hunter's entry point to the
center of 26th Avenue and determined it was 156 feet.

(R., p.45.) The district court

also took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. (Tr. 2/20/14, p.2, Ls.1-8.)
The State conceded that the five-second rule in section 49-808(2) did not apply to travel
on Cleveland Boulevard, but argued that Mr. Hunter did not signal for 100 feet prior to
turning and, therefore, Corporal Pelkey's detention was proper based on a violation of
section 49-808(2).

(R., pp.45-46.)

The State argued, alternatively, that Mr. Hunter

violated Idaho Code section 49-644 because he did not turn into the farthest right lane
of Cleveland Boulevard.

(R., p.38.)

Finally, the State argued that Mr. Hunter also

violated section 49-808(2) because he did not give the appropriate signal prior to
changing lanes. (R., pp.38-39.) The district court found that Mr. Hunter signaled for
100 feet prior to turning left onto 26th Avenue, but did not make a specific ruling that
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Mr. Hunter did not violate section 49-808(2). (R., pp.45-48.) It also did not reach the
State's claims that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-808(2) by not signaling before
changing lanes, although the court did find that Mr. Hunter never established himself in
the right lane. (R., pp.45-48.) The district court ultimately ruled that Corporal Pelkey
had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Hunter based on a violation of section 49-644
because he did not turn right into the farthest right lane of Cleveland Boulevard.
(R., pp.44-48.)
Mr. Hunter entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of felony driving
under the influence, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision on his
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.52-63.) He timely appealed from the district court's order
denying his Motion to Suppress. (R., p.83.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hunter's Motion to Suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hunter's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hunter asserts that the district court erred when it denied his Motion to

Suppress because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Corporal Pelkey
detained him without reasonable suspicion. He requests that the district court's order
denying his Motion to Suppress be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals

articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress:
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hunter's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a standard
of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby
safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions."
Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002).
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State v.

An investigative detention is

constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from specific
articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264 (Ct. App.
2001 ).

1.

Corporal Pelkey Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain
Mr. Hunter Because Mr. Hunter Did Not Violate Idaho Code Section 49808 (2)

Idaho Code section 49-808 states in relevant part:
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway
unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety
nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall
be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all
other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.
The State below conceded that Cleveland Boulevard is not a controlled access
highway. (R., p.46.) Therefore, in order to comply with section 49-808(2), Mr. Hunter
was only required to signal for 100 feet prior to turning left onto 26th Avenue.

The

district court found that, after establishing himself in the left lane, Mr. Hunter traveled
approximately 150 feet while signaling a left turn.

(R., p.45.)

As such, Mr. Hunter

complied with 49-808(2) and, therefore, Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain Mr. Hunter based on a violation of section 49-808(2).
The State argued, alternatively, that Mr. Hunter also violated section 49-808(2)
because he did not signal for 100 feet prior to changing lanes from the right lane to the
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left lane. (R., pp.38-39.) This position is not supported by the facts ultimately found by
the district court. The district court found, and Mr. Hunter concedes on appeal, that he
did not turn into the right lane and establish himself there. (R., p.45.) Since he was
never in the right lane, he was not required to signal a move from the right lane to the
left lane. Therefore, a detention cannot be justified based on a violation of this section.

2.

Corporal Pelkey Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain
Mr. Hunter Because Mr. Hunter Did Not Violate Idaho Code Section 49644

Idaho Code section 49-644 states, in relevant part, that "[B]oth the approach for a
right-hand turn and the right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand
curb or edge of the roadway." Mr. Hunter agrees that, as a general rule, I.C. § 49-644
requires that a person turn right into the farthest right lane prior to changing lanes into

the adjacent lane. See In Re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44-45 (Ct. App. 2013). However,
the plain language of the statute provides an exception to the general rule in that a
person is not required to make a right turn into the farthest right line if it is not
practicable.

I.C. § 49-644.

In a recent opinion regarding the interpretation of Idaho

Code section 49-637(1) (lanes of travel), the Idaho Court of Appeals recently defined
the word "practicable": "In our view, however, the term 'practicable' is unambiguous. It
is defined as 'able to be done or put into practice successfully,' NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY

1338 (2001 ),

and

DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990)."

as

'feasible in the

State

V.

circumstances,' BLACK'S LAW

Neal, No. 42534, 2014 WL 5151426, at *5

(Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (review granted).

The district court found that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-644 because he did
not turn into the right lane of Cleveland Boulevard, but instead drove across it and into
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the left lane of Cleveland Boulevard. (R., pp.44-48.) Mr. Hunter concedes that he did
not establish himself in the right lane before proceeding to the left lane and signaling his
turn onto 26th Avenue. However, given the circumstances, Mr. Hunter maintains that
he was in compliance with section 49-644 because it was not practicable for him to turn
into the right lane, since doing so would prevent him from complying with 49-808(2),
which required him to signal for 100 feet prior to turning onto 26th Avenue.

Unlike

section 49-644, section 49-808 does not provide an exception for practicability.

As

such, Mr. Hunter was required to be in the left lane for 100 feet so that he could signal
his turn onto 26th Avenue. See I.C. § 49-808(2). Given the distance, the only way he
could comply with section 49-808(2) was to cross the right lane and proceed into the left
lane. (See Motion to Suppress, Defense Exhibits A-O.) Therefore, it was not feasible
under the circumstances, and therefore not practicable, for Mr. Hunter to comply with
section 49-644.
The State argued below that Mr. Hunter could have complied with both sections
49-644 and 49-808(2) if he had turned into the right lane, signaled, 1 moved to the left
hand lane, and then signaled for another 100 feet in the left lane before he reached 26th

The State argued below that Mr. Hunter would only have to signal "appropriately,"
rather than for 100 feet, prior to changing lanes from the right lane to the left lane, but
he would then have to signal for 100 feet after reaching the left lane in order to turn onto
26th Avenue. (Tr. 2/20/14, p.27, L.4 - p.28, L.5.) The State based its internally
inconsistent position on the Court of Appeal's opinion in Burton v. Idaho Dep't of
Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 749-50 (Ct. App. 2010). In this case, the Court of
Appeals held that section 49-808 was vague as it applied to a situation where two lanes
blended into one with neither lane ending or continuing and, therefore, a person does
not violate the statute by not signaling in that instance. Id. Mr. Hunter's case does not
involve merging lanes. The State presented neither a coherent argument nor authority
for why Mr. Hunter would have to signal for 100 feet once he reached the left lane, but
would not have had to signal 100 feet prior to moving from the left lane to the right lane.
1
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Avenue. The State's position is indefensible because it is impossible, and, therefore,
clearly impracticable.

Corporal Pelkey measured the distance from the center of

Cleveland Boulevard at Mr. Hunter's entry point to the center of 26th Avenue and
determined it was 156 feet. (R., p.45.) Of course, a person who is traveling in the left
lane on Cleveland Boulevard could drive 56 feet past Mr. Hunter's entry point and still
signal for 100 feet prior to turning left on 26th Avenue.

However, a person who is

entering Cleveland Boulevard from Mr. Hunter's entry point would not be able to comply

with both sections 49-644 and 49-808(2). Per section 49-644, a person would have to
make his turn onto Cleveland Boulevard into the right lane. Then, in order to turn left
onto 26th Avenue, he would have to be in the left lane.

Thus, once he established

himself in the right lane, he would have to signal for 100 feet before he could change
lanes into the left lane, per section 49-808(2). Then, once he was established in the left
lane, he would have to signal for another 100 feet before making a left turn onto 26th
Avenue, per section 49-808(2). This is simply not possible given the available distance
of 156 feet.
The district court based its opinion that Mr. Hunter violated section 49-644 on the
Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in In Re: Beyer, supra, 155 Idaho at 44-45. However,
In Re: Beyer is not applicable here. The defendant in In Re: Beyer argued that section

49-644 did not require that a person make a right turn into the farthest right lane, and
that his behavior did not violate the statute because it fell within the broad range of
normal driving behavior. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the statute is unambiguous
and that failing to do what the statute demands cannot be considered normal driving
behavior.

Id.

Mr. Hunter neither argues that section 49-644 is ambiguous nor that
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failure to comply with the statute is normal driving behavior. Rather, he asserts that he
acted in accordance with the statute because, per the plain language of the statute,
compliance is only required when it is practicable.
Mr. Hunter made the safest turn possible under the circumstances. He came to
a complete stop at Cleveland Boulevard. (Tr. 11/8/13, p.15, Ls.4-11.) He pulled onto
Cleveland Boulevard, immediately turned on his left blinker, and merged into the left
lane, then continued to signal for approximately 150 feet. (R., p.45.) Turning into the
right lane and establishing himself there was not practicable under the circumstances
and would have made it impossible for Mr. Hunter to comply with section 49-808(2).
Therefore, Mr. Hunter did not violate I.C. § 49-644, and his detention cannot be justified
on that basis.

D.

All Evidence Collected Following The Police's Illegal Detention Of Mr. Hunter
Should Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only

to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990).

The test is

"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371
U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would
not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct."

Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
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State v.

Corporal Pelkey did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Hunter.

Had

Corporal Pelkey not illegally detained Mr. Hunter, he would not have investigated
Mr. Hunter for driving under the influence.

The State failed to meet its burden of

showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, the evidence must be suppressed.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Hunter respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and
commitment, reverse the district court's order denying his Motion to Suppress, and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 30 th day of January, 2015.

KJMBERL Y E. SMITH
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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